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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(e), U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant/Appellant court 
appointed counsel or an opportunity to retain counsel when the Defendant/Appellant 
expressly and repeatedly requested an attorney and where the trial court failed to make 
any inquiry into the Defendant's/Appellant's indigence, competence, or his desire to 
represent himself. 
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Standard of Review. The Defendant/Appellant believes this issue is a question of 
law and is therefore reviewed for correctness. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781, 
295 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 
(Utah 1994) (issue of waiver of constitutional rights is reviewed for correctness). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Motion to Arrest 
Judgment two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and 
the Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.) 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant/Appellant a 
continuance on the day of trial so that he could retain counsel where such denial 
implicates the Defendant's/Appellant's fundamental right to counsel. 
Standard of Review. This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, i.e., no reasonable basis for the decision. See State v. 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). However, when a continuance is sought to 
retain or replace counsel, greater scrutiny is required. See U.S.A. v. Burton, 
584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a motion for a new trial 
two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and the 
Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.) 
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3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's/Appellant's 
motion for new trial where the trial court had forced the Defendant/Appellant to represent 
himself at trial and where the trial court had failed to make any inquiry into the 
Defendant's/Appellant's competence or his desire to represent himself. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion 
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. 
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 
1280 (Utah App. 1996). In this case, the trial court denied a new trial because (1) the 
Defendant/Appellant had no right to counsel, or (2) the Defendant/Appellant untimely 
requested counsel. The trial court's reasons are believed to be incorrect conclusions of 
law, and therefore, the standard of review in the instant case should be reviewed for 
correctness. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Motion to Arrest 
Judgment two days following the Defendant's/Appellant's conviction at a bench trial, and 
the Defendant/Appellant timely filed on July 22, 1996, his Notice of Appeal. (R. 18, 75.) 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence, (emphases added). 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 (in part). 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, (emphasis 
added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-l-6(l)(a), 6(l)(f), (6)(2)(d) (1995): 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
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(2) In addition: 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband 
against his wife;. . . 
(emphasis added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-1, et seq.(pertinent part): 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of indigent persons in 
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in 
accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of the indigent defendant's liberty; 
(emphasis added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (pertinent part): 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily injury 
to another. 
(emphasis added). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (pertinent part): 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six months: 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety days, 
(emphasis added). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301 (pertinent part): 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not 
exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree; 
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(d) $lr000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction: 
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute, 
(emphasis added). 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 17 (pertinent part). 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No 
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee, Layton City ("City"), a political subdivision of the State 
of Utah, initiated this action on July 21, 1995, pursuant to § 76-5-102, U.C.A., against the 
Defendant/Appellant, Daniel Longcrier ("Daniel"), by issuing a summons for "Simple 
Assault." (R. 1, 8.) Daniel was charged by Information with assaulting his female friend, 
and the mother of their child, on June 16, 1995. (R. 5.) The police officer's report 
indicates that he "observed no physical signs or injury" on the girlfriend.1 (Police Report 
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed its "Response to Defendant's Request for Discovery" on 
February 28, 1996 (R 24 ) Although the Response clearly states that a copy of the police report is attached, such 
report is missing from the Recoid For completeness and for reference, Daniel has attached hereto a copy of the police 
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at 4, attached hereto as Addendum 1.) Two months subsequent to the alleged assault, 
Daniel and his alleged victim were married. 
2. Daniel, a nineteen year old young man who completed only the tenth grade, 
resides in Bountiful, Utah. (R. 92; Hr'g Tr. at 7, lines 20-21, attached hereto as 
Addendum 2.) Daniel has no record of any other criminal or traffic violations. (R. 37.) 
3. On October 11, 1995, Daniel appeared without counsel at a pre-trial conference. 
(R. 1.) The following week the trial court scheduled the trial on February 21, 1996. (Id.) 
4. Upon departing the pre-trial conference, Daniel asked the City's Prosecutor if he 
could have an attorney. (R. 93, 95; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 3-4, at 10, lines 21-25, 
Addendum 2.) The Prosecutor indicated to Daniel that any appointment of counsel was 
up to the judge of the trial court. (Id.) 
5. Sometime prior to the trial date, Daniel telephoned the trial court and asked 
whether he could have an attorney. (R. 93; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 7-9, Addendum 2.) He 
was told by a clerk that when he arrived at the court he should ask the judge for an 
attorney. (Id.) 
6. On February, 21, 1996, the day of trial, Daniel asked Judge Bean for an attorney. 
(R. 68; R. 85, Trial Tr. at 3, lines 13-15, attached hereto as Addendum 3.) Without any 
inquiry of Daniel's indigence, competence, or desire to represent himself, Judge Bean 
denied Daniel's request for an attorney, denied a continuance for Daniel to retain counsel, 
report referenced in the Plaintiffs/Appellee^ Response as Addendum 1 
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and immediately forced Daniel to proceed to trial. (Id. at lines 13-17.) 
7. During the trial, Daniel was not represented by counsel; he presented no defense 
whatsoever. (R. 1.) 
8. Since Daniel was without counsel through all proceedings prior to and during the 
trial, Daniel failed to request a jury trial as required by Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P. 
9. During the trial, the Prosecutor called Daniel's wife as a witness to testify against 
him in direct violation of Daniel's rights to not have his wife testify against him. (R. 1.) 
When her testimony was not helpful to the Prosecution's case, the Prosecutor entered into 
evidence, against the objections of Daniel, his wife's prior written statement. (R. 12, 15.) 
10. Daniel, without any legal representation, was found guilty of a Class B 
Misdemeanor at a bench trial held on February 21, 1996. (Id) 
11. Upon conviction, but prior to sentencing, Daniel then sought help for the first 
time from his present counsel. (R. 93-94; Hr'g Tr. at 8-9, lines 25-8, Addendum 2.) 
12. Immediately after being found guilty, the City's Prosecutor recommended "jail 
time" to the trial court. (R. 1.) However, after Daniel retained counsel the following day 
and said counsel filed a Motion for a new trial, the City's Prosecutor offered to withdraw 
his recommendation for jail time in an effort to plea bargain Daniel's case. (City's Letter, 
dated March 26, 1996, attached hereto as Addendum 4.) 
13. At the sentencing hearing on February 23, 1996, Daniel was represented by his 
present counsel who filed a written motion to the trial court for Arrest of Judgment or a 
New Trial. (R. 2, 16-23.) Instead of proceeding with sentencing, the trial court heard 
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oral argument from the attorneys on Daniel's Motion and then took the matter under 
advisement. (R. 2, 67.) 
14. The trial court scheduled a second hearing on the issue of what Daniel knew 
about his rights to an attorney and when he knew it. (R. 2.) That hearing was held on 
April 16, 1996, and the trial court again took the matter under advisement. (R. 2-3, 107.) 
15. On July 9, 1996,2 Judge K. Roger Bean entered a written and signed decision 
which denied Daniel's request for a new trial. (R. 3, 67.) Judge Bean's decision admits 
that he "made no inquiry as to whether [Daniel] qualified for appointed counsel" because 
the Court "considered the request untimely." (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, attached 
hereto as Addendum 5.) The trial court also relied on a line of cases set forth in the City 
Prosecutor's brief and which brief opposed Daniel's motion for a new trial. (R. 69; 
Mem. of Decision at 3, Addendum 5.) Finally, the trial court plainly admits that it "did 
not have the opportunity to determine whether" Daniel qualified or not for a court 
appointed attorney. (Id.) 
16. On July 22, 1996, the trial court sentenced Daniel. (R. 73-74.) The trial court 
imposed a fine of $800.00 and 90 days in jail, with $200 of the fine and the jail time 
suspended upon payment of the fine. (Id.) The trial court also imposed a requirement 
that Daniel enroll in an anger management course for eight weeks. (Id.) Daniel filed his 
Notice of Appeal the following day, July 23, 1996. 
Although Judge Bearfs Memorandum of Decision, (R 67 ), is dated June 14, 1996, it was not filed 
and served until July 9, 1996 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central, underlying issue in Daniel's appeal is whether or not he possessed a 
fundamental right to retain counsel to assist him in his defense. This is not to be 
confused with whether Daniel had a right to court appointed counsel, which depends on 
whether he was indigent and whether he faced the substantial probability of jail time. If 
Daniel enjoyed the right to retain counsel to assist him, not court appointed counsel, then 
the trial court clearly erred in not permitting him an opportunity to retain counsel, in not 
granting a continuance long enough for Daniel to retain such counsel, and in not granting 
Daniel's request for a new trial because his fundamental rights were clearly infringed. 
The entire line of cases dealing with the issue of an accused's right to counsel are all 
predicated on court appointed counsel. The City's Prosecutor filed an opposition 
memorandum in response to Daniel's motion for a new trial, and the cases cited therein 
all deal with court appointed counsel or court paid transcripts. The trial court incorrectly 
relied on those cases, and Daniel believes, that the trial court became confused as to the 
central issue in this matter: whether Daniel has a fundamental right, irrespective of 
whether incarceration is involved, to retain his own counsel. 
If the trial court's theory were to hold, then any court that was prepared to avoid 
imposing jail time could then deny any defendant, rich or poor, the right to bring counsel 
to represent him or her in any criminal proceeding. Such a position would extend 
Argersinger and Scott well beyond their intended boundaries. The implications are 
profound and most disturbing; they cannot be correct and cannot stand. 
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The trial court failed to provide even a modicum of fairness to Daniel. The trial 
court provided no instructions, printed or otherwise, for accused indigents to follow in 
obtaining court appointed counsel. The trial court could easily see that Daniel was 
young, inexperienced, and he never presented any defense during his brief thirty minute 
trial. Despite these observations, the trial court failed to conduct any colloquy with 
Daniel regarding his indigence, competence, or his desire to represent himself. The 
burden on the trial court was slight; the burden placed on Daniel, because of the trial 
court's failure to act in the interests of justice, was and remains heavy. 
ARGUMENT 
Although this appeal presents three issues, they are all interrelated. The underlying 
question to all three issues is whether or not Daniel possessed the fundamental right to 
the assistance of counsel at his trial If he had no right to counsel or if the denial of 
counsel was harmless, then Daniel's appeal lacks merit. Appropriately, this underlying 
question is paramount to the analysis of the three issues presented and is analyzed first. 
I. Daniel possessed the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel at his trial. 
Our Constitutions grant fundamental rights to persons accused of crimes. 
Specifically, accused persons are entitled to "have the assistance of counsel" or to 
"appear and defend in person and by counsel." U.S. Const., Sixth Am.; Utah Const., Art. 
I., Sec. 12. This right is also granted by Utah's laws: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel: 
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§77-l-6(l)(a), U.C.A. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . 
Rule 17, UtahR. Crim P. 
This right has enjoyed immense success over the years.3 The courts have also 
extended this right to indigent persons by requiring our various governments to provide 
free counsel to indigent persons in criminal cases. See Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 
440 U.S. 367, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012, 407 
U.S. 31, 37, L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). Notwithstanding this right, the United States Supreme 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have each limited the right to enjoy court appointed 
counsel to cases where the accused faces a substantial probability of imprisonment or is 
actually sentenced to serve jail time. Id.; see also Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 
906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) (while right to court appointed counsel is a fundamental 
right, it is not absolute); City of St. George v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah App. 1992) 
(trial court erred by granting the city's motion to withdraw appointed counsel where there 
was a substantial probability of jail time). 
In Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected Florida's curtailment of 
court appointed counsel to cases where the imprisonment was six months or longer. 
Argersinger, 92 S. Ct. at 2009. The Court strongly reaffirmed the need for counsel in 
For an excellent discussion of the right to assistance of counsel, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
92 S. Ct. 2006, 407 U.S. 31, L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). 
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criminal cases, including misdemeanors and minor offenses: 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair 
trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means 
convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case 
that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any 
less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or 
more. Id. at 2010. 
The Court also expressed its concern that less serious cases may be short-changed in 
our very busy courts: 
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number 
than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, 
regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967), states: 
"For example, until legislation last year increased the number of 
judges, the District of Columbia Cour t . . . . had four judges to 
process the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony cases, 
7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 petty offenses and an 
equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable 
consequence of volume that large is the almost total preoccupation in 
such a court with the movement of cases. The calendar is long, 
speed often is substituted for care . . . Inadequate attention tends to 
be given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting his rights, 
[or] sifting the facts at trial, . . . The frequent result is futility and 
failure." M a t 2011. 
The Court also cited several studies, including one by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970): 
"One study concluded that "[mjisdemeanants represented by 
attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all 
charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without 
counsel." Id. at 2012 (emphasis added). 
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The limitations imposed by governments and the courts, state and federal, relate 
solely to court appointed counsel. There are no known limitations to retained or privately 
paid counsel The underlying balancing force against providing free counsel to indigents 
with no limitations and in all cases is the social cost: 
In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack 
of available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it 
thought these arguments were factually incorrect. But they were rejected 
in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion that incarceration 
was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a 
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed 
counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit 
in such a rule. Scott, 99 S. Ct. 1158 at 1162-63 (emphasis added). 
In essence, the entire line of cases dealing with defining limitations on the right to 
counsel, deal exclusively with court appointed counsel It is important and necessary to 
this analysis to clearly distinguish between the right to the assistance of counsel and the 
right to the assistance of court appointed counsel While Daniel may have been entitled 
to court appointed counsel at his trial, the trial court admits, without any apologies, that it 
failed to make any inquiry on the issue of whether or not Daniel was indigent. (R. 68, 85; 
Trial Tr. at 3, lines 13-15, Addendum 3.) Daniels appeal, however, does not depend on 
his indigence. 
The core argument presented herein is that Daniel had a right to have counsel assist 
him at trial, regardless of whether such counsel was court appointed or whether Daniel 
independently retained counsel Notwithstanding Daniels status as an indigent, the 
record is clear that Daniel was in fact able to retain his present counsel, even if such 
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counsel was retained on a pro bono basis. 
Layton City's Prosecutor filed a memorandum in opposition to Daniel's motion for a 
new trial. (R. 34-39.) None of the arguments made by the City contend that Daniel had 
no right to retain counsel. All of the cases cited by the City are those in which the 
limitation on the right to counsel refers to the right to court appointed counsel. See id. 
The City misapprehends the concept which the courts have articulated that the right to 
counsel is "not absolute." See id. The courts intended that phrase to mean the "right to 
court appointed counsel is not absolute." 
II. The trial court erred in denying court appointed counsel for Daniel or denying 
him an opportunity to retain counsel because the trial court failed to make any 
inquiry into Daniel's indigency competence, or his desire tQ represent himselft 
a. If indigent, Daniel was entitled to court appointed counselt 
From the foregoing analysis, Daniel clearly had a right to retain counsel to assist 
him in his defense at trial. Whether he was entitled to court appointed counsel is yet to 
be determined. If, however, he qualified as an indigent, Daniel would have been entitled 
to court appointed counsel because he faced the substantial probability of jail time. See 
§ 77-32-1, U.C.A. Daniel was charged with a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. 5.) Such 
offense carries with it a potential penalty of jail time "not exceeding six months" and a 
fine "not exceeding $1,000:' §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301, U.C.A. 
Not having any sentencing statistics for Judge Bean's court nor statistics of 
sentences for "simple assaults" in the Second Judicial District, the only information 
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available to assess the likelihood of jail time is the City's recommendation for a penalty. 
Immediately following Daniel's conviction, the City recommended "jail time due to 
aggravated circumstances." (R. 1.) It was only after Daniel's present counsel filed a 
motion for a new trial did the City offer to retreat from its "jail time" recommendation. 
See City 's Letter, Addendum 4.) 
"The City is willing to reduce the charge from assault to one of 
disorderly conduct, a class "C" Misdemeanor. Upon Mr. 
Longcrier's plea of guilty to that amended charge, the City will 
recommend that no jail time be imposed,. . ." (Addendum 4.) 
If the Court were generally inclined to follow the City's sentencing 
recommendations, Daniel certainly faced "the substantial probability of deprivation of the 
indigent defendant's liberty." See § 77-32-1, U.C.A. Ironically, the City's memorandum 
in opposition to a new trial focused on the fact that the trial court could not impose jail 
time because Daniel had not been represented by counsel at trial. (R. 34-39.) If that was, 
or is, the City's understanding of the law, then the City was disingenuous by 
recommending jail time for Daniel immediately following Daniel's trial when the City 
knew at the time of its recommendation that Daniel had not been represented by counsel. 
(R. 1.) If the City truly believed that Daniel should be incarcerated in the interests of 
justice, the City should have urged the trial court to either appoint counsel for Daniel or 
permit him time to retain counsel of his choice. Following that course would have 
permitted the City to adhere to its convictions that Daniel deserved jail time. Instead, the 
path followed by the City obviously and admittedly now precludes such an outcome. 
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b. Daniel never waived his right to the assistance of counselt 
Although the trial court and the City suggested during the hearings on Daniel's 
motion for a new trial that Daniel had waived his right to counsel by his actions, it is well 
established that a defendant must waive his or her right to counsel "knowingly and 
intelligently." See e.g. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987)(assistance of 
counsel is personal and may be waived by a competent accused if the waiver is 
knowingly and intelligently); State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986)(record 
must show that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understanding^ 
rejected the offer)(citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 
(1962); State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1981)(record failed to demonstrate that 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel); State v. McDonald, 
922 P.2d 776, 786 (Utah App. 1996)(even though trial court failed to make an ideal 
inquiry into whether defendant made an intelligent waiver, the trial court correctly 
determined defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel). 
There is no indication in the record that Daniel ever desired to represent himself. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that Daniel waived his right to counsel. 
The trial court admits that it "made no inquiry as to whether [Daniel] qualified for 
appointed counsel." (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, Addendum 5.) The trial court 
appears to draw significance from the fact that there was a space for "Defendant's 
Attorney" on the court's Notice of Pretrial and its Notice of Trial, and such designation 
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was "five-eighths" or "one-half of an inch within Daniel's signature. {Id. at 1,2.) 
Apparently, the trial court attempts to infer that Daniel had waived his right to 
counsel and was conveying by his actions that he desired to represent himself. 
Notwithstanding such inference, the trial court falls far short of any sort of "colloquy" 
with Daniel as suggested in Frampton, 731 P.2d at 187. In fact, the trial court set forth in 
its Memorandum of Decision its entire brief colloquy with Daniel. (R. 68; Mem. of 
Decision at 2, Addendum 5.): 
Court: Is the City ready to proceed? 
Mr. Garside: We are, your honor. 
Court: Mr. Longcrier, are you ready to proceed? 
Mr. Longcrier: I need an attorney. They said, when I called, that I 
could ask for one. 
Court: Just have a seat, sir. The Court denies your request for 
a continuance so that you could get a lawyer, and you 
may proceed, Mr. Garside. 
The foregoing is the entire colloquy between the trial court and Daniel. It is clear 
that the trial court made no effort to inquire whether Daniel desired to represent himself. 
Further, there is no evidence advanced by the trial court or the City that Daniel ever 
expressed any desire or intention to represent himself. 
The instant case parallels Ruple, 631 P.2d at 876. In Ruple, 
the defendant here at the time of trial had not finished the twelfth grade of 
school and suffered from minimal brain disfunction as well as dyslexia. 
While the defendant had been in the court before, mostly on juvenile 
charges, the record does not reveal that he had ever gone through a trial or 
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had even witnessed a trial the likes of which he was about to conduct. 
The record does not demonstrate that the defendant "knowingly and 
intelligently" made his choice to represent himself. The judgment below 
is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Id. at 786. 
Daniel failed to advance beyond the tenth grade in school. He has never been in 
court prior to this case because he has no prior arrests or violations. (R. 37.) Most 
importantly, the trial court failed to establish by any means that Daniel waived his right to 
counsel, whether such counsel was to be court appointed or retained by Daniel. 
III. The trial court erred in denying Daniel a continuance on the day of trial so that 
he could retain counsel because such denial effectively denied Daniel's 
fundamental right to counsel, 
While the trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a continuance, when 
such continuance implicates a fundamental right such as a defendant's right to counsel, 
the trial court's actions should be scrutinized more closely. See State v. Cabututan, 
861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah App. 1993); U.S.A. v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541 (Utah CD. 
1987)(right to counsel to be balanced against the orderly administration of justice); U.S.A. 
v. Barton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(when continuance implicates Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, right to select counsel must be balanced 
against the orderly administration of justice). What is a reasonable delay depends on all 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. Burton, 584 F.2d at 490. The court in Burton, 
articulated several factors to be considered in balancing the defendant's right to counsel 
with the orderly administration of justice: 
. . . the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have 
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been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience 
to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested 
delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or 
contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which 
gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has 
other competent counsel prepared to try the case; whether denying the 
continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if 
so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; the 
complexity of the case; and other relevant factors which may appear in 
the context of any particular case. Id. at 491. 
In the instant case, Daniel had not sought any prior continuance. The trial was 
simple, lasting only about thirty minutes; the police officer involved was not present for 
the trial. The continuance was for the sole purpose of allowing Daniel sufficient time to 
obtain counsel. Daniel was not provided any instructions on how to apply for a court 
appointed attorney except that he was merely told to "ask the judge." (R. 93, 95; Hr'g Tr. 
at 8 lines 7-9, Addendum 2.) The burden on the trial court to grant a continuance was 
slight. The minor delay in collecting any monetary fines from Daniel, assuming he were 
found guilty, posed very little burden on the State; Daniel's freedom was not an issue 
since he could not be incarcerated. On balance, it seems that Daniel's right to retain 
counsel far outweighs any burdens such continuance would impose on the trial court and 
its orderly administration of justice. 
Finally, the record reflects that Daniel's sole source of information concerning a 
court appointed attorney came either from the City or one of the trial court's clerks. (R. 
93, 95; Hr'g Tr. at 8, lines 3-4, 7-9, Addendum 2.) Daniel was never provided any 
written instructions. He relied on what the court's clerk told him. Id. When he arrived at 
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the trial court, he asked for an attorney. (R. 68; Mem. of Decision at 2, Addendum 5.) 
Unfortunately, the trial court barely gave him the time of day. Id. Daniel asked for an 
attorney. Id. The trial court, quickly, abruptly, and with no dialogue with Daniel, denied 
his request and immediately proceeded to trial. Id. 
Interestingly, the trial court's reliance on State v. Penderville, 272 P.2d 195 
(Utah 1954), actually supports Daniel's position. The court in Penderville was reversed 
because the court failed to permit the defendant his right to represent himself. Id. at 199. 
The defendant, who initially had counsel, requested to represent himself the day before 
trial, but he wanted more time to prepare for trial. Id. The trial court was of the opinion 
that the application by the defendant was a made in bad faith. Id. However, Utah's 
Supreme Court opined in Penderville: 
Regardless of what we may conclude to be the motives of the defendant, 
he failed in the effort and no delay was occasioned by his having made 
the application [for a continuance]. Can it be said that the appellant lost 
his right to defend in person by his unsuccessful effort to have his trial 
postponed to get other counsel? We think not. The right to defend in 
person certainly should no be denied an accused in a situation where he 
must either choose to use it or proceed with counsel in whom he has lost 
confidence. We hold that the court erred in denying appellant the right to 
try his case without the aid of counsel and that because of this error he is 
entitled to a new trial. Id. 
An accused's constitutional rights to defend (1) in person or (2) with the assistance 
of counsel appear as co-equal rights. A person either defends with counsel or by self-
representation. The court in Penderville held that a defendant had a fundamental right to 
make a last minute change from being represented by counsel to self-representation. Id. 
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In the instant case, Daniel desired to be represented by counsel. Even if, arguendo, he 
had earlier expressed a desire to represent himself, the trial court had a duty to honor 
Daniel's request to be represented by counsel, notwithstanding his request was made at 
the beginning of the trial. A short continuance is more efficient than a new trial. It also 
promotes greater justice. 
IV. The trial court erred in denying Daniel's motion for new trial because the trial 
court forced Daniel to represent himself at trial without making any inquiry into 
DaniePs competence or his desire to represent himself. 
In Utah, a trial court may grant a motion for a new trial "in the interest of justice if 
there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of 
a party." State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988). There can be no doubt 
that Daniel's rights were substantially and adversely infringed by having no counsel to 
represent him at trial. He could have requested a jury trial; without counsel he was 
unaware of Rule 17. His wife's testimony and her prior written statement were used 
against him. (R. 1, 12, 15.) The police officer was not present to testify that he 
"observed no physical signs or injury," nor was his report entered into evidence. (R. 1., 
Police Report at 4, Addendum 1.) Daniel presented no defense. (R. 1.) In essence, 
Daniel's lack of counsel at trial was devastating to him. 
The trial court appeared to deny Daniel's request for a new trial based on an 
incorrect legal conclusion. The trial court relied on the line of cases presented by the 
City in its opposition memorandum. (R. 69; Mem. of Decision at 3, Addendum 5.): 
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The Prosecutor's argument, set forth in his brief, that the Defendant 
has no right to the assistance of counsel unless he is sentenced to 
incarceration, is also directly in point. Most of the cases cited there 
refer to court appointed counsel. Because of the timing of 
Defendant's request for appointed counsel, the court did not have the 
opportunity to determine whether he qualified or not. Id. 
The trial court's Decision infers that Daniel had no right to retain counsel of his 
own. Yet, Daniel clearly has a right to counsel, even though he may not have a right to 
court appointed counsel. The trial court never made this distinction. Accordingly, the 
trial court's legal conclusion, on which it based in part or whole its denial of Daniel's 
motion for a new trial, is so flawed that it undermines the very footing on which the trial 
court's denial of a new trial stands. 
It is also remarkable, sadly so, that the trial court could choose to characterize its 
brief encounter with Daniel on the day of trial as not having an "opportunity" to 
determine whether Daniel qualified as an indigent. The trial court clearly had an 
opportunity to take a few minutes to engage Daniel in some sort of colloquy about his 
indigence, competence, or his desire to represent himself. Instead, in its rush to clear 
another misdemeanor from the calendar, the trial court ignored Daniel's fundamental 
rights. 
Equally remarkable, the trial court consumed considerable trial court time in 
hearings on Daniel's request for a new trial. Such time exceeded by a factor of two the 
combined amount of time for the initial trial plus the estimated time for a new trial. Yet, 
he trial court seems to base much of its reasoning on an efficiency theory. That is, the 
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reason for denying Daniel's request for an attorney was in part because his request came 
to the trial court's attention at the last minute, thereby potentially creating a thirty minute 
gap in the trial court's calendar that day, February 21, 1996. 
CONCLUSION 
Daniel clearly has a right to retain counsel to assist him in his defense. The trial 
court denied him this fundamental right, which substantially and adversely affected him 
when he was found guilty after bench trial and without mounting any defense. The trial 
court also erred by not granting a continuance so that Daniel could retain counsel; and 
again erred by not granting Daniel's request for a new trial when it was clear that 
Daniel's fundamental rights were trampled upon. The Court of Appeals should reverse 
the judgment below. The better view, however, and in the interests of justice, the Court 
of Appeals should not burden Daniel or the trial court with another trial, albeit brief; it 
should dismiss the charge against Daniel. 
DATED this 2nd day of January 1997. 
^lli'dtyCah^— 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN, Esq. (7231) 
Counsel for Daniel Longcrier 
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IAYTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
PAGE: 1 RID: 231795.AP043 DR#: 9503443 
OFFICER: King 
SUBJECT: Family fight 
On 06-16-95 at 2330 hours, RO responded to 2200 W on a family fight 
prior. RO spoke to the victim, a 19 year old female. RO 
determined an assault took place. RO also spoke to two witnesses. 
RO was unable to locate the suspect- RO did complete a complaint 
questionnaire-
On 06-16-95 at 233 0 hours, a Stephanie Owen at 512 N 2200 W 
contacted this agency regarding a fight with her live in boyfriend. 
Stephanie indicated that the boyfriend had left the area, but she 
wished to speak to an officer. 
RO did speak to Stephanie at her home. Stephanie indicated that 
she had been assaulted by her boyfriend, Daniel Longcrier. 
Stephanie also stated that Daniel brandished a knife also. 
Stephanie stated that she and Daniel have a child together and do 
live together. 
Stephanie provided the following facts to RO. Stephanie and Daniel 
began arguing in Bountiful at 1800 hours. Stephanie stated Daniel 
is regularly using crank (methamphetamine) and that he was under 
the influence on this date. Stephanie stated that Daniel tried to 
get some money from her to buy crank. Stephanie stated Daniel 
tried to take her planner and she refused. Daniel twisted her neck 
and hit her. This occurred in Bountiful. 
Stephanie stated at 2100 hours, at their home, Daniel placed a 
stereo, television, vcr, and • computer in his truck. Stephanie 
stated that Daniel was going to pawn the items to buy more crank. 
Stephanie stated she tried to get the computer back and a fight 
ensued. Stephanie stated that she took Daniel's keys and that 
Daniel pulled a knife out and pointed the knife at her. Stephanie 
stated that Daniel demanded to have his keys back. Stephanie 
stated that a friend, John Phillips and his wife Kehli Phillips 
were present. Stephanie stated John stepped in and Daniel threw 
the knife out into the street. Stephanie stated that Daniel then 
ripped her clothes off. RO did observe a pair of levis that were 
torn open. Stephanie stated Daniel was slapping at her and calling 
her names. Stephanie stated Daniel then left with another friend, 
but later returned to get his truck. 
RO observed no physical signs or injury.on Stephanie. RO asked 
Stephanie if she would like to speak to a victim's advocate. 
Stephanie declined. RO did have Stephanie, John, and Kehli, 
complete witness statements. 
RO was not able to locate Daniel. RO did complete a complaint 
questionnaire for assault against Daniel. RO did ask Stephanie to 
contact RO if Daniel returned home. 
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Case No. 951001606 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE K. ROGER BEAN 
April 16, 1996 
Evidentiary Hearing 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For Plaintiff: Susan L. Hunt 
Assistant Prosecutor 
City ofLayton 
437 N. Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
For Defendant: Michael A. Jensen 
900 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
1 April 16, 1996 3:00 P.M. 
2 PROCEEDINGS 
3 
4 THE COURT: Miss Hunt, do you have, is that your understanding, do you have 
5 evidence. 
6 MS. HUNT: Your Honor, it is my understanding that this was set for an evidentiary 
7 hearing, but it's the city's position, at this point, that really the court does not need to hold an 
8 evidentiary hearing because, and I don't know if the court has had an opportunity to read the 
9 memorandum that's been prepared by Mr. Garside on this, but-
10 THE COURT: I'm part way through that, but we were at judges' meetings when 
11 that was filed and I simply haven't had a chance-
12 MS. HUNT: That's right. I knew that the court, Your Honor, had been out of town 
13 and so, but the city's position, basically, is that the only issue to be resolved by the court is 
14 whether or not the defendant had a right to appointed counsel and that if the court finds that the 
15 defendant did have such a right, then the court probably should vacate the trial. But it's the 
16 city's position that, and recommendation, that the court proceed to sentencing in this matter and 
17 the city's recommendation is that the court impose no jail time on the defendant, but only impose 
18 a fine for this matter. And then the city takes the position that if the court imposes no jail time, 
19 that there's no actual jail time for this offense, then the defendant has no right to counsel. And, 
20 therefore, there is no need to make any finding in the record that the defendant knowingly and 
21 voluntarily waived that right because there isn't such a right. And there's a recent Utah case on 
22 this, Salt Lake City v. Grotepas where the defendant was charged with an infraction and the 
23 court ordered the defendant to pay a fine as a result of that. The defendant was represented by 
24 counsel at trial and then appealed the conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
25 And the court decided that because the defendant had no right to counsel, then the court could 
4 
1 not consider whether or not the counsel was effective or ineffective simply because there was 
2 no right to counsel to begin with. And there's some prior Utah case law that says even though 
3 in Grotepas you have a situation where the defendant was charged with an infraction, and there 
4 was no possibility of jail time, the court took that clear, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah 
5 Courts, that the proper inquiry is not whether or not there is a possibility of jail time, but whether 
6 there is actual jail time imposed on the defendant. And, so in this case, if there were no jail time 
7 imposed on Mr. Longcrier as part of his sentence for this offense, that he would have no right 
8 to counsel. And there being no right to counsel, there's no need for the court to make any 
9 inquiry into whether or not he normally and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. So that's 
10 the position the city is taking and I think based on that, it really would be moot for the court to 
11 hold an evidentiary hearing as to what the defendant knew. If the court were to find that, for 
12 example, that the defendant talked to me in the hall and asked about appointed counsel and I told 
13 him very clearly and plainly that he would have to request counsel from the court and explained 
14 to him the whole procedure for doing that, even if the court found that that happened, and the 
15 court made no finding in the record that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right 
16 to counsel, then the court still would be precluded from imposing any jail time, as I read the case 
17 law. So whether or not that occurred is really a moot issue. 
18 THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Mr. Jensen, why don't you go ahead. 
19 MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, Mr. Garside responded to our Motion for a new trial, 
20 and I received it on Friday, and cited a line cases, all of which related to the taxpayers picking 
21 up appointed counsel or taxpayer paid transcripts. There was not a single case cited which 
22 denied the defendant the right to counsel. It is only balancing the need for counsel and the 
23 possible imposition or penalty of imprisonment, but none of them dealt with why the counsel— 
24 THE COURT: Doesn't the Grotepas case expressly deal with the right to counsel in 
25 a criminal case9 
5 
1 MR. JENSEN: Only for indigents. All of those were indigents. All of those were 
2 taxpayers and if you read the Scott case — 
3 THE COURT: Well, it doesn't turn on any tax question. You're not saying to the 
4 court it turns on the question of the taxpayers being involved. It really turned on the question 
5 whether or not that defendant had the right to counsel period. 
6 MR. JENSEN: No. 
7 THE COURT: It didn't? 
8 MR. JENSEN: No, Your Honor. In fact, they rely on the Scott case, which is the 
9 U.S. Supreme Court case on which they rely, all of this derives, and the Scott case was simply 
10 on indigency. And if you read the text of that case, you will see that this was really a balancing 
11 to preserve the rights guaranteed in the Constitution versus the rights of burdening the courts 
12 with providing counsel for every little petty offense. 
13 THE COURT: Have you read Grotepas? 
14 MR. JENSEN: Yes, I have. 
15 THE COURT: Did he not have his own counsel at trial? 
16 MR. JENSEN: Yes, he did. 
17 THE COURT: And didn't the appeal go up on ineffective counsel? 
18 MR. JENSEN: It did, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Well, what does that have to do with taxes? 
20 MR. JENSEN: Well, I'm just saying that the whole line case, all those were indigent 
21 cases. 
22 THE COURT: Grotepas wasn't indigent. 
23 MR. JENSEN: No, but what they were doing is they were analogizing ineffective 
24 counsel claims to all of the indigent claims. And besides, Grotepas is simply an infraction. There 
25 was never any possibility of imprisonment. 
6 
1 THE COURT: Yes, well I'm saying, yes, you're right. 
2 MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes, on that-
3 THE COURT: That was precisely the point of the Court of, of the Supreme Court 
4 when they reversed the Court of Appeals. 
5 MR. JENSEN: Yes, but what I'm saying is, what I'm trying to suggest is that the 
6 infraction, okay, never had the possibility of imprisonment. 
7 THE COURT: Yes, that's correct. 
8 MR. JENSEN: Now, if we follow the theory that the prosecution would like this court 
9 to adopt, what it is really saying is that this court, from here after, could deny counsel [to a 
10 defendant] whether he wanted to pay for it himself or not, as long as you didn't impose 
11 imprisonment, you can't have counsel. And so if the court looked at the record before and 
12 decided that this was not a case in which it was going to impose imprisonment, but was just 
13 going to impose a conviction of penalty, this court could then say, "sorry, you don't have a right 
14 to counsel." " I don't care whether you can pay for it or not, you have no right to counsel." 
15 And we never reached that point in this case. This defendant was never given an opportunity to 
16 either select his own counsel or get court appointed counsel. And so, you can't take these line 
17 of cases as now saying that every defendant that comes before this court is going to be denied 
18 counsel, or, if they are imprisoned, then they have a right of appeal, but if they aren't imprisoned, 
19 tough. You know, you could impose a thousand dollars, two thousand dollar fine, conviction, 
20 whatever, but you don't have a right to counsel. These line of cases are very different than the 
21 present case, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Do you really think that the necessary extension of what Ms. Hunt is 
23 arguing for is that the court could deny counsel even if the defendant wanted to retain his or her 
24 own counsel? 
25 MR. JENSEN: You bet, because that's exactly what has happened in this case. This 
1 individual, Daniel, did not choose to have his own counsel. He didn't choose not to have 
2 counsel at all. 
3 THE COURT: What did he choose? Tell me what he chose. 
4 MR. JENSEN: He thought, he was under the impression, that when he came to this 
5 court, he was going have court appointed counsel. 
6 THE COURT: Can you tell the court where he got that idea? 
7 MR. JENSEN: Well, if we can put him on the stand, Your Honor. Would that be 
8 alright? 
9 THE COURT: Sure, you can put him on. He needs to be sworn. Would you raise 
10 your right hand to be sworn? 
11 CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony about to be given is the truth, the 
12 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
13 MR. LONGCRIER: I do. 
14 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Longcrier, would you please tell the court when you first 
15 requested— 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, I think we better make a record. We better make a record 
17 on his name and his address so that we know who he is. 
18 MR. JENSEN: Oh, okay, I'm sorry. Would you please state your name and address 
19 for the record? 
20 MR. LONGCRIER:' My name is Daniel Longcrier. I live at 418 West Center Street 
21 in Bountiful, Utah. 
22 THE COURT: Please go ahead. 
23 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Longcrier, sometime earlier this year, there was a hearing, a plea 
24 hearing. Can you tell us what happened at that hearing regarding an attorney9 
25 MR. LONGCRIER: I really can't remember everything that happened I can't 
8 
1 remember, really 
2 MR JENSEN You can't remember anything? 
3 MR LONGCRIER Yea, I talked, at the plea, I talked to Miss Hunt outside and she 
4 said that, um, I asked her if I could have an attorney and she said, um, I don't know her exact 
5 words, but basically, she told me I had to come to the court for an attorney 
6 MR JENSEN So, then what did you do next? 
7 MR LONGCRIER So, let's see, I called the court house and they told me, I talked 
8 to the secretary She told me that when I got to court, I could have one appointed to me All 
9 I had to do is talk to the judge 
10 MR JENSEN And then what happened when you got to court? 
11 MR LONGCRIER I asked the prosecuting attorney if I had a lawyer and he told me 
12 I didn't And I asked him if I could get one and he told me that I couldn't 
13 MR JENSEN And where did that conversation take place? 
14 MR LONGCRIER It's just outside, in the court house lobby 
15 MR JENSEN Before the trial? 
16 MR LONGCRIER Yea, before 
17 MR JENSEN Let's just make this very clear He said to you, you asked him if you 
18 had an attorney? 
19 MR LONGCRIER Yea, and he said that if I didn't have one, then I couldn't have 
20 one 
21 MR JENSEN So if you didn't have one, you couldn't have one 
22 MR LONGCRIER Well, I think his words were, um, you don't have an attorney, 
23 and I told him no And he said, well, that's too bad And I said, can I get one, and he just didn't 
24 answer me nothing, just basically said no 
25 MR JENSEN Had you sought out a private attorney any time in between? 
9 
1 MR LONGCRIER No, I didn't 
2 MR JENSEN And why didn't you? 
3 MR LONGCRIER I thought that I would be granted one when I came to court 
4 MR JENSEN Your Honor 
5 THE COURT Thank you You may sit down Ms Hunt, you may cross examine 
6 MS HUNT I don't have any questions 
7 THE COURT The court has a couple of questions Mr Longcrier, do you watch 
8 TV? 
9 MR LONGCRIER A little bit 
10 THE COURT Did you get the idea from watching television sets, pardon me, 
11 television programs that deal with legal cases, that the court would appoint for you from that 
12 source'? 
13 MR LONGCRIER I don't see what you mean 
14 THE COURT Did you ever watch a law case, court case on television where 
15 appointment of an attorney was the subject matter of the program? 
16 MR LONGCRIER No, not really 
17 THE COURT Tell us, where did you get the idea that the court would appoint a 
18 lawyer for you? 
19 MR LONGCRIER I called the secretary and she said I could get one appointed 
20 THE COURT Did she just say it just that way or did she put some qualifications on 
21 it 
22 MR LONGCRIER She said, I asked her, I said, I need to get a court appointed 
23 attorney How do I go about getting one and she said, just come in on the day of your trial and 
24 ask the judge for one 
25 THE COURT And so, did you do that9 
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1 MR LONGCRIER Well, I kind of got the feeling that I wasn't going to be 
2 appointed one 
3 THE COURT Well, did you ask the judge for a lawyer? 
4 MR LONGCRIER No 
5 THE COURT Why didn't you ask the judge for a lawyer? 
6 MR LONGCRIER I didn't know how to get in contact with the judge 
7 THE COURT When you were in the court, you came in and entered a plea, did you 
8 ask for one then? 
9 MR LONGCRIER At the plea? 
10 THE COURT Well, at any time Have you ever asked the court for a lawyer? 
11 MR LONGCRIER I did right before my trial 
12 THE COURT On the day of trial? 
13 MR LONGCRIER On the day of trial, I asked for one 
14 THE COURT At any time before that, did you request a lawyer? 
15 MR LONGCRIER From the state, no, not except for when I called to the court 
16 house 
17 THE COURT In other words, when you first came in for what we call arraignment, 
18 you didn't ask for one then and at the time you entered your plea in this case, you didn't ask for 
19 a lawyer at that time, I guess? 
20 MR LONGCRIER No, I didn't know I was suppose to 
21 THE COURT And then when you came back for pre-tnal is that when you talked 
22 to Ms Hunt? 
23 MR LONGCRIER Urn, I believe so 
24 THE COURT And she told you to ask the court for a lawyer? 
25 MR LONGCRIER I don't remember exactly what she said, but it was something 
11 
about that. 
THE COURT: But, at the pre-trial, you didn't do that? 
MR LONGCRIER: No 
THE COURT: Why didn't you do that? 
MR. LONGCRIER: I wasn't aware that I was suppose get in touch with you right 
away, (inaudible). 
THE COURT: But the clerk had told you that you should ask the judge? 
MR LONGCRIER: Yea. 
THE COURT: When did you expect you would ask the judge? 
MR. LONCRDER: She said to come in the day of my trial and the judge would 
grant one to you. 
THE COURT: Those are her words? 
MR. LONGCRIER: Not her exact words, no. 
THE COURT: What are her exact words as near as you remember? 
MR. LONGCRIER: I called on the phone. I asked, I need to get a court appointed 
attorney and — 
THE COURT: But, I think you mentioned that you were talking to Ms. Hunt and I 
think you quoted her words a moment ago. I'm asking you to tell the court what you can 
remember about her words, not a telephone call. 
MR LONGCRIER: Oh 
THE COURT: When you were here at pre-trial talking to Ms. Hunt, what did she 
say? 
MR. LONGCRIER. The only thing I remember about our conversation was that she 
told me that I had to come to the court house. I don't remember her exact words, (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Do you know who Ms. Hunt is9 
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1 MR. LONGCRIER Yea. 
2 THE COURT: Did you come to a pre-trial and have a face to face conversation with 
3 her? 
4 MR. LONGCRIER: I can't remember if it was my pre-trial or my plea that we talked. 
5 THE COURT: She wouldn't have been here for your plea if we assume— 
6 MR. LONGCRIER: It was my pre-trial. 
7 THE COURT: Alright and what did she tell you about getting a lawyer appointed at 
8 the pre-trial hearing? 
9 MR. LONGCRIER. I don't remember. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jensen, anything further? 
11 MR. JENSEN: I have just a couple of questions, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Yes. Redirect. You can ask whatever you want that's relevant. 
13 MR. JENSEN: Did you, at any time, on the day of the trial or any time prior, 
14 expressly state that you wanted to waive your right to counsel? 
15 MR. LONGCRIER: No. 
16 MR. JENSEN: Were you ever asked if you wanted to waive your right to counsel? 
17 MR. LONGCRIER: I can't remember if I was asked that question. 
18 MR. JENSEN: Did you ever express to the court or anyone else that you wanted to 
19 represent yourself? 
20 MR. LONGCRIER: No. 
21 MR. JENSEN: That's all, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything Ms. Hunt? 
23 MS. HUNT No. 
24 THE COURT You may step down, Mr. Longcrier. Do you want to complete your 
25 presentation, Mr. Jensen, to the court9 
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1 MR. JENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. It is very clear a defendant like Daniel has a right 
2 to either represent himself or to have counsel. If he chooses one, he has waived the other. If he 
3 chooses to represent himself, he's waived his right to counsel. But he has to make some 
4 expressed waiver for that to happen. In this case, there is no evidence that he ever desired to 
5 represent himself or waived his right for counsel. The record is just the opposite. It's very clear 
6 that he thought he was going to be represented by counsel. He asked to be represented by 
7 counsel. 
8 THE COURT: When did he ask? When did he ask? 
9 MR. JENSEN: Well, he asked on those two occasions. 
10 THE COURT: Well, he asked on one, he testified about. He said he asked at the time 
11 of trial, but he wasn't— 
12 MR. JENSEN: He asked Your Honor on the day of trial, that's correct. But he 
13 didn't, (inaudible) at the same, he didn't say (inaudible) have the presence of mind to say, well, 
14 if I can't get a court appointed counsel, then I want to see if I can get some other counsel. 
15 THE COURT: But on the day of trial, Mr. Jensen, surely you wouldn't expect if 
16 parties are here prepared to go ahead that the court's going to grant a continuance for him to go 
17 and seek counsel when he's already been told that he should have requested it earlier than that. 
18 You wouldn't expect the court to say, yes, we're going to stop everything now and send these 
19 witnesses home so you can go and talk about counsel, to see if you can get counsel or whatever 
20 you would like to do. 
21 MR. JENSEN. Well, it certainly would have been appropriate even if you were in the 
22 middle of the trial if the counsel became ineffective for the courts to protect the rights of the 
23 defendant by making sure that due counsel was appointed (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: That's Ms. Hunt's argument, thougn. If the court isn't going to 
25 imprison, he doesn't have that right. 
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1 MR. JENSEN: But the point is, at the time, there is no assurance. The prosecution 
2 at the very time that he was being denied counsel was recommending prison time. 
3 THE COURT: Well, jail time. Imprisonment. 
4 MR. JENSEN: Imprisonment, confinement. That was the situation. So at that 
5 particular time, he had no rights to represent himself, I mean, to have counsel. That's all I'm 
6 saying. And, furthermore, because of what actually transpired at the trial, that is, his wife was 
7 compelled to get on the witness stand against him. 
8 THE COURT: Does that strike — do you practice much criminal law? 
9 MR. JENSEN: No, I don't, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Let me, would you believe that every day in courts along the Wasatch 
11 front, parties are subpoenaed, maybe are reluctant to testify and come to court, and would rather 
12 not testify, but unless they have a privilege and exercise it, or unless they have a 5th amendment 
13 privilege and exercise, they have to testify. That's the way it works. 
14 MR. JENSEN: But a wife cannot be compelled to testify against her husband. 
15 THE COURT: If she invokes her privilege. 
16 MR. JENSEN: It's his privilege. 
17 THE COURT: If he invokes the privilege. Neither one did. 
18 MR. JENSEN. That's what I'm saying that without counsel.... 
19 THE COURT: Well, can I presume with him sitting there, or any court presume with 
20 him sitting there, that he has not chosen to represent himself? 
21 MR. JENSEN: I think there has to be an express, the court has a duty to—. 
22 THE COURT: No, no. 
23 MR. JENSEN. Oh, yes, Your Honor, in the case of Ruple The case is so clear, in 
24 fact, it's so parallel to this situation, State v. Ruple 
25 THE COURT: What was the in charge in that case9 
15 
MR. JENSEN. Your Honor, I can't find it quickly here. I have the case here with me, 
but I can find it in just a moment. 
MS. HUNT: I can tell it was a felony. 
THE COURT: Ms Hunt. 
MS. HUNT: The charge. I think it was a distribution of marijuana felony charge 
in that case. 
THE COURT: It was a felony charge? 
MS HUNT: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's all I needed to know, thank you. 
MR. JENSEN: Well, I don't know if it was a felony charge. We'll look at it and see. 
But what I'm suggesting is that the defendant in that case parallels Daniel very, quite a bit, in 
terms of his education. The court took that into consideration, and took into consideration his 
education. He did not finish high school. He was dyslexia. He had never had experience. He 
had never had experience in a trial before, had no possible way of properly representing himself. 
And the court said that the trial court erred. It should have taken that into account; it should 
have given him and looked at his rights very carefully in that case. 
THE COURT: OK, I'll look at that. Anything else you want to tell the court? 
MR. JENSEN: There is one other, one other case that I would like to also look at. 
It is also very relevant to that. And that is State v. Drobel a 1991 case. 
THE COURT: What state is that in? 
MR. JENSEN: Utah. 815 P.2nd 724. Again, he asked to represent himself which 
the court granted. He was convicted. Again, the issue really is the competency of the individual 
to be able to represent himself in a court like this. But, in this case, again, he never said he 
wanted to represent himself and he never said he wanted to waive the right to counsel. And 
that's the, I think that's really the crux of it here i s -
16 
1 THE COURT: Well, you may be right, but I guess you're not saying to the court that 
2 if a person chooses to exercise his or her constitutional right to represent himself, it doesn't 
3 matter how much education he has, does it? 
4 MR. JENSEN: Well, it may not matter except that the court should make a reasonable 
5 inquiry as to the person's competence to be able to do that before they let them represent 
6 themself. And both those the cases addressed that issue. The court had a duty to make an 
7 inquiry of the individual to see if they reasonably could [represent themself]. You certainly 
8 wouldn't let a totally incompetent person say, CT want to represent myself," when they really 
9 couldn't do that, because you would know that they couldn't possibly have a fair trial under 
10 those circumstances. 
11 THE COURT: I don't know. I suppose if a totally incompetent person, I would 
12 concede that. You don't claim that Mr. Longcrier falls in that category? 
13 MR. JENSEN: No, I don't, Your Honor, but I'm just suggesting that the cases I've 
14 just cited took into account the degree of their sophistication and their knowledge and their 
15 competency, and that was a factor. 
16 THE COURT: Alright. 
17 MR. JENSEN: Is there anything else, Your Honor? 
18 THE COURT: I think not. Thank you and I'd like to hear from Ms. Hunt if she has 
19 anything she would like to tell the court. 
20 MS. HUNT: No, no. First of all, counsel's summary of the city's position 
21 (inaudible) thing that (inaudible) defendant any counsel (inaudible). But what this case boils 
22 down to is whether or not defendant has the right to appointed counsel, and while the court at 
23 this point, it's kinda difficult to go back and determine whether or not the defendant was indigent 
24 for the purpose of the simple reason, we assume (inaudible). Assuming that the defendant is 
25 indigent, urn, (inaudible) but even assuming that the defendant was indigent, (inaudible) actually 
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1 imposes jail time to this defendant, there is never any right to court appointed counsel. And if 
2 there's not a right to court appointed counsel, then there's no need to vacate the trial that 
3 happened. The defendant, whether he waives his right to counsel, the court does not need to ask 
4 defendants who aren't entitled, who don't have those rights to counsel, whether or not they 
5 waive their right to go out and hire their own attorney. It's just for those that choose to do that. 
6 I think we should assume that everybody knows that you go out and hire an attorney to represent 
7 them unless they're told otherwise and they never would be told that. For a defendant to come 
8 to court and say I didn't know I could hire an attorney to represent me because the court never 
9 told me that, it is beyond the realm of comprehension. But the cases cited by the city all are on 
10 the point of right to counsel. And the case that counsel talked about, as far as the case that 
11 involves the defendant's request for a transcript, provided at taxpayer's expense, that's Murray 
12 City v. Robinson. The way that the court decided that was that the court said the issue of 
13 whether or not a transcript will be provided is totally dependent on whether or not the defendant 
14 in this case had a right to counsel. 
15 THE COURT: To court appointed counsel. 
16 MS. HUNT: Court appointed counsel, that's right. And in this case, the court said 
17 that there having been no actual jail time imposed for the offense, there is no right to counsel or 
18 court appointed counsel. And therefore, there is no right to have transcripts provided at 
19 taxpayer's expense. And the court in that decision stated Robinson, while she may have faced 
20 the mere threat of imprisonment (inaudible). Moreover, we cannot speculate about Robinson's 
21 potential sentence, because Robinson's conviction resulted in a fine only. And so, it's the city's 
22 position that if the court in this case does not impose jail time, then there's no need to go back 
23 and say at the time of the trial, was there a potential for jail time? There's no need to speculate 
24 about that In fact, if the court imposes absolutely no jail time for this offense, there is no right 
25 for court appointed counsel. Then there's no need for anyone to ever ask the defendant whether 
18 
1 or not he wanted to waive his right to counsel, if there wasn't a right. And the courts have said 
2 a right to counsel is a fundamental right, it is not an absolute right. (Inaudible), so again, the city 
3 recommends that the court proceed with sentencing, and sentence the defendant to pay a fine and 
4 the possibility of a counseling program and a term of probation, but not impose any jail time. 
5 (Inaudible) 
6 THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Mr. Jensen, you get the last word. 
7 MR. JENSEN: It is true that Mr. Longcrier didn't secure private counsel. The 
8 prosecution suggests that he had that right and he could have done that, and just because he 
9 didn't, they can't be blamed. But the issue is, and I believe from his testimony here today, that 
10 he was under the clear perception that an attorney would be appointed for him here. I don't 
11 think that was unreasonable. It's a simple trial. The trial shouldn't last more than 30 minutes. 
12 It's a simple case. I don't believe the prosecution prepared very much for this. They didn't have 
13 to. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I don't think you would know about that, Mr. Jensen. 
15 MR. JENSEN: Well, I do for the sense that they told me how long the trial was. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that that would tell you how long they prepared 
17 fork. 
18 MR. JENSEN: Oh, the prosecution. 
19 THE COURT: Yes, that was your statement. 
20 MR. JENSEN: It's speculation. It's a very simple case. All I'm saying is that he was 
21 under the perception that he was going to have a court appointed attorney. So when he arrives 
22 here and he was denied that, now -1 don't know if it was one day or two days when I was called 
23 - so when he was denied that on the day of trial, I was called either that night or the next day 
24 because the sentencing was either the next day or two days later. So he did take action once he 
25 was told by the court that he couldn't have a court appointed attorney. There was never an 
19 
1 inquiry as to whether he was indigent or not, and so there can't be anything based on whether 
2 he is or is not indigent. That was never at issue because it was never inquired of him. In fact, 
3 at the last hearing, Mr. Garside contended that Daniel Longcrier probably would not qualify for 
4 a court appointed attorney. It's just his speculation. 
5 THE COURT; Well, is it your position before the court today in arguing this motion 
6 that he should have been offered court appointed counsel and, that if offered, he would have 
7 qualified? 
8 MR. JENSEN: No, not at all. That's just backwards. You have to first be qualified 
9 and then have a court appointed attorney. 
10 THE COURT: Well, a -
11 MR. JENSEN: In his own mind-
12 THE COURT: Something has to trigger the whole discussion about court appointed 
13 counsel, doesn't it? 
14 MR. JENSEN: In his own mind, because of his low income, he lives in subsidized 
15 housing, and he gets Medicaid and he gets other state assistance, in his own mind, he thought 
16 that he probably would qualify for some kind of appointed counsel. Whether he does or he 
17 doesn't is a fact question that would have to be determined; but it was never inquired, so he just 
18 thought he was going to have it. 
19 THE COURT: What do you think should trigger that inquiry? 
20 MR. JENSEN. When he asked for a court appointed attorney. 
21 THE COURT: In court? 
22 MR. JENSEN. Absent any other instructions or directions, yes. 
23 THE COURT: OK 
24 MR JENSEN. He was told to come to court. 
25 THE COURT: When did he ask in court? 
20 
MR. JENSEN: It was my understanding at the beginning of the trial. 
THE COURT: OK, don't you think that's an unreasonable point at which a party 
should ask for counsel? 
MR. JENSEN: I think it would only be unreasonable if the person asking had some 
prior knowledge or understanding or instructions or something. But this person— 
THE COURT: Wasn't his testimony here on the witness stand that Ms. Hunt did tell 
him at pre-trial? He had to ask the court for court appointed counsel and he didn't ask for it at 
the pre-trial. 
MR. JENSEN: I understand he asked Ms. Hunt after the pre-trial on the way out. So 
he went home, and subsequent to then he called the court. If he had asked before (inaudible), 
I could understand that. 
THE COURT: That's what I assumed his testimony meant. See, the pre-trial is 
between counsel and the party first, before they ever come into court. They talk then. They 
don't talk afterwards. I don't know what Ms Hunt's recollection of that is. Ordinarily, the 
discussion with Ms. Hunt would be before he came into court. 
MR. JENSEN: My client told me that it was on the way out, afterwards. So what I'm 
saying, I don't think that's unreasonable for him to ask at that point in time because that's the 
limit of his knowledge It would have been a very small burden on the court to simply say, 
"Now, are you really prepared to represent yourself on this or would you rather seek private 
counsel?" But there was ho inquiry made. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, as you say, you don't practice criminal law much, but I 
suppose if you went into circuit court and watched how misdemeanor cases flow, you would 
realize how impractical that is. If the court were to ask people, are you sure you want to go 
ahead now, or do you feel that you would like to have counsel, in 90% of the cases, the 
defendant would say, oh yes, I guess I better go talk to counsel. And you wouldn't be trying any 
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1 misdemeanor cases. We have to cover that ground ahead of the time of the trial. It simply 
2 makes no sense to get to the trial time with witnesses sitting here and counsel ready to go and 
3 have a party say, oh, gee, I guess I really need a lawyer. You can see that can't you? 
4 MR. JENSEN: Again, I can see it has to be balanced with the defendant's rights for 
5 counsel. By the same token, if you're in the middle of the trial, if he had retained me or 
6 somebody else, I was here and died in front of this court, the court would certainly grant a 
7 continuance to get new counsel. 
8 THE COURT: Well, yes, that's a whole different ball game there. 
9 MR. JENSEN: Why is it? 
10 THE COURT: It's a totally unexpected event where he has brought counsel with him 
11 and he expects to have the assistance of counsel and doesn't have it suddenly. And that's a 
12 whole different ball game than for him to come here and create the impression with everyone 
13 concerned that he's got to represent himself That he's made that choice. He has not requested 
14 counsel before the beginning of the trial. He's going to represent himself and then he doesn't 
15 like the outcome of the trial, so a day later, he called you. Now that's the kind of scenario we 
16 have, isn't it? 
17 MR. JENSEN: Except for one thing. 
18 THE COURT: OK, what? 
19 MR. JENSEN: Clearly, all the evidence that's been put before this court shows that 
20 Mr. Longcrier expected counsel to represent him at his trial. There's nothing to the contrary. 
21 Nobody has been able to present any evidence to the contrary to that. 
22 THE COURT: Well, when you're trying to look into a person's mind, you know, 
23 being a law trained person, that we have to look at the outward indicia, the outward indications, 
24 and it's hard to know what his expectation was unless we look at the way he behaved He 
25 behaved as a person who came to court expecting to represent himself and not expecting to have 
22 
counsel. That's what his behavior showed us. 
MR. JENSEN: Even though he asked for counsel? 
THE COURT: No he didn't ask for counsel until the moment of trial, and he's not 
about to get counsel at the moment of the trial when that's his first request of the court. Isn't 
that true, here? Doesn't all the evidence show, including his statements here on the witness 
stand, that he made no request for trial until the commencement of the trial. 
MR. JENSEN: He was told by the court personnel that that was the procedure. 
THE COURT: No, I don't accept that he was told that that was the procedure. He 
was told somewhere along the line, he testified, by telephone call to the clerk that he should ask 
the court for counsel. And I gather from the time frame that he testified about that, that it came 
prior to the pre-trial. You're saying it was afterwards? 
MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes. Oh, definitely. I believe it was the day before the trial. He 
was told to come to the court and ask for counsel. (Inaudible). If you would like, we could put 
him on the stand. It was very clear that he was told to come to court at his trial and ask for 
counsel. Based on that, there was no other expectation that he had. 
THE COURT: Alright. Anything further? I'll look at the cases you cited and the 
ones Ms. Hunt cited and make a decision. 
MR. JENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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February 21, 1996 3 0 0 P M 
PROCEEDINGS 
We'll continue with the court's afternoon calendar The clerk will 
Layton City v Daniel Longcner, Case No 951001606 (inaudible) 
Is Mr Longcner present in court? He doesn't answer Have you 
THE COURT 
call our next matter 
CLERK 
THE COURT 
heard from him? 
MR GARSIDE Yes, Your Honor 
THE COURT Mr Longcner would you stand up please? We would like you to 
come up to this table over here on your left, sir Is the city ready to proceed? 
MR GARSIDE We are, Your Honor 
THE COURT Mr Longcner, are you ready to proceed? 
MR LONGCRIER I need an attorney They said that when I called that I could ask 
for one 
THE COURT Just have a seat, sir The Court denies your request for a 
continuance so that you can get a lawyer You may proceed, Mr Garside 
(Proceedings concluded) 
Tab 4 
Mayor • Jerry Stevenson 
City Manager • Alex R. Jensen 
Asst. City Manager • James S. Mason 
• Office of the City Attorney • 
Gary R. Crane • City Attorney 
Telephone: (801) 546-8530 
FAX: (801) 546-8535 
March 26, 1996 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
Re: Layton City vs. Daniel Longcrier 
Dear Mr. Jensen: 
This letter is in response to your request that I reduce to writing the proposed plea negotiation. This 
is per our telephone conversation on Friday, March 22, 1996. The City is willing to reduce the 
charge from assault to one of disorderly conduct, a class "C" Misdemeanor. Upon Mr. Longcrier's 
plea of guilty to that amended charge, the City will recommend that no jail time be imposed, that the 
Defendant be given the opportunity to do community service in lieu of fines, or a combination 
thereof, and that the Defendant be required to attend counseling to address this incident. 
With regard to our discussion regarding expungement, the applicable provision is § 77-18-12(2)(d). 
As stated, it is a three (3) year period. 
If the aforementioned is not your understanding of my proposal, please contact me immediately to 





SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
STATE OF UTAH, bv and through 
LAYTON CITY, a Municipal Corporation. 
Plaintiff, Case No. 951001606 
v. Date 6-14-96 
PANISL IQNGCRIEP, 
Defendant Judge Bean 
MATTER: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT OR NEW 
TRIAL 
The Court took Defendant's alternative Motion under advisement to consider the 
arguments advanced by counsel at the hearing, the authorities cited by each side, 
and the history of the case's progression dom arraignment to the filing of that 
Motion. 
Defendant was charged with assault by Information filed July 21 , 1995. A 
Summons and Order for booking was issued that same day and served on 
Defendant by delivery to his mother August 14, 1995. Defendant appeared for 
arraignment August 23, 1995. He appeared alone, representing himself. He 
entered a not guilty plea and pretrial was set for October 11,1 995. Defendant 
received a Notice of Pretrial that had lines for "Defendant", "Plaintiff's Attorney" 
and "Defendant's Attorney" printed within less than an inch of each other on the 
form. Defendant's signature on the Notice is within five-eighths of an inch of the 
reference to "Defendant's Attorney." Defendant was given a copy of the Notice. 
The pretrial had to be reset to a week later, but Defendant did not receive notice of 
the new date because he'd moved and had not given the clerk his new address. 
Defendant appeared for pretrial on October 11, 1995, and was told about the new 
date. Defendant appeared alone, representing himself, on that date. He was given 
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a copy of the Notice of the new setting; it referred to "ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT" 
just above the line for Defendant's signature. 
Defendant appeared for pretrial on October 18, 1995, and discussed the case with 
the prosecutor. No negotiation was reached between them and the case was set 
for trial on February 2 1 , 1996. Again, Defendant's signature appears 
approximately one-half inch from the reference to "Defendant's At torney" on the 
Notice of Trial. Defendant appeared alone, representing himself, at the pretrial. 
On February 2 1 , 1996, the case was called for trial. Defendant appeared alone, 
representing himself. When the court asked the parties if they were ready to 
proceed, the fol lowing colloquy occurred: 
Court: Is the city ready to proceed? 
Mr. Garside: We are, your honor. 
Court: Mr. Longcrier, are you ready to proceed? 
Mr. Longcrier: I need an attorney. They said, when I called, that I could ask for 
one. 
Court: Just have a seat, sir. The Court denies your request for a 
continuance so that you could get a lawyer, and you may proceed, 
Mr. Garside. 
The Court considered the request untimely, and for that reason made no inquiry as 
to whether Defendant qualified for appointed counsel. The trial proceeded and 
Defendant was convicted on the evidence presented. 
In State V. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 2 8 1 , 272 P.2d 195 (Utah 1954), the Utah 
Supreme Court dealt wi th the reverse situation, but its observations about a 
continuance are pertinent. The Court said: 
On December 2, 1952, the trial court set the case for trial December 
17, 1 952. On the day before the trial was to commence the trial court 
received a letter from appellant complaining about the service being 
rendered by his attorney and requesting a postponement of the trial to 
enable him to procure other counsel. Immediately after receipt of the 
letter the trial court had the appellant brought before him to discuss 
appellant's request. A transcription of shorthand notes of the 
conversation had between the trial court and appellant constitutes a part 
of the record. This record does not reveal a showing on the part of the 
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appellant to the effect that his attorney had been unfaithful or 
incompetent in preparing appellant's case, nor does it show that 
appellant or his attorney were not ready for trial. The court did not err 
in denying appellant's application for a postponement. . . . The 
Constitution of this State provides: 'In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel' 
Const, art. 1, § 12. . . . It is generally, if not universally held that the 
accused in a criminal proceeding who is sui juris and not mentally 
incompetent has the right to conduct his own defense without the aid of 
counsel. An accused may not, however, having once elected to proceed 
with the aid of counsel for purposes of delay or to obstruct the 
proceeding against him advance successfully an insincere claim of his 
right to defend in person. 
That decision was reversed on appeal because the trial court allowed appointed 
counsel to represent the defendant, in spite of the defendant's expressed desire to 
represent himself, a right the court should have afforded him. But the Court's 
comments about delay are on point for this case. 
The prosecutor's argument, set forth in his brief, that the Defendant has no right to 
the assistance of counsel unless he is sentenced to incarceration, is also directly in 
point. Most of the cases cited there refer to court-appointed counsel. Because of 
the timing of Defendant's request for appointed counsel, the Court did not have the 
opportunity to determine whether he qualified or not. 
The Court denies Defendants alternative Motion, and resets sentencing for 
Monday, July 22, 1996, at 10:30 a.m. The clerk will notify both Defendant and 
defense counsel. If that date or t ime is not convenient, counsel should telephone 
the clerk and request a different setting. 
The Court apologizes to counsel for the delay in getting this decision reduced to 
writ ing and mailed. r \ p. 
1 J u d g e 
Case No: 951001606 MC 
Certificate of Mailing 
I c e r t i f y t h a t on the <9^day of , /u A , j(}rUc, 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Atty for Defendant 
FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA 
170 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Circuit Court Clerk 
' ueputyClerk " 
1 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
Davis County, Layton Department 





60 West 1950 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Notice of Sentencing 
Case No.: 951001606 MC 
You will please take notice that the above entitled case is set for 
Sentencing 
in the Circuit Court, Layton Department, 425 Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah. 
Date: July 22 , 1996 Time: 10:30 a.m. Courtroom: 1 
A copy of this notice was mailed, postage pre-paid, to the above named defendant and to: 
Michael Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR AS INDICATED ON THIS FORM COULD RESULT 
IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
Dated: July 9, 1996. 
Court Clerk 
^fr^U 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special 
accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this proceeding 
should call the A.D.A. Clerk at 451-4409, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
